Murray State's Digital Commons
Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity

Faculty Works

7-30-2021

Communication and Learning: The Bilateral Information
Transmission in the Cobweb Model
Eran Guse
Murray State University, eguse@murraystate.edu

M. C. Sunny Wong
University of Houston, mwong8@central.uh.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/faculty
Part of the Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Guse, E., & Wong, M. C. (2021). Communication and Learning: The Bilateral Information Transmission in
the Cobweb Model. Computational Economics, 1-31.

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Murray State's Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity by an authorized
administrator of Murray State's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
msu.digitalcommons@murraystate.edu.

2

Eran Guse, M. C. Sunny Wong

Communication and Learning
The Bilateral Information Transmission in the Cobweb Model
Eran Guse · M. C. Sunny Wong

Received: date / Accepted: date

Abstract Communication is a natural activity to gain information and exchange ideas for making proper economic decisions. The mechanism of social interaction remains inadequately understood. Previous studies have investigated the consequences of communication under a one-way information
transmission mechanism from more-informed leaders to less-informed followers. This mechanism leads to the “boomerang effect” – a reduction in leaders’
forecasting efficiency due to the information transmission. However, communication should be interactive. This paper devises a two-stage interactive cobweb
model with a generalized information diffusion process called the bi-directional
information diffusion (BID) process, which allows both information transmission and feedback mechanisms. Numerical analysis and simulations show that
the model has multiple equilibria and can be dynamically stable under certain
conditions. More importantly, the BID process improves forecast efficiency for
all individuals, and the boomerang effect disappears if leaders correctly observe
followers’ forecasts to revise their expectations.
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1 Introduction
Communication is one of the fundamental human behaviors that are of great
interest to economic researchers. Daily decisions are often made based on information obtained by communicating with friends or acquaintances or watching
the news. While the additional information can be potentially useful, miscommunication can commonly occur for various reasons: inattention, lack of
interpretational skills, or inadequate delivery from the speaker. The imperfect
communication process may produce uncertainty or volatility in the economy, confounding people to make optimal decisions (Granato et al. 2008).
As a result, people have incentives to enhance effective communication and
improve comprehension via learning. This paper investigates how communication and learning mechanisms can affect forecast behaviors and accuracy in a
self-referential dynamic market.
Game theorists and experimental economists have extensively investigated
how communication, considered a signaling process, can promote coordination
(Schelling 1960).1 Farrell (1987, 1988) examines the effect of structured costless communication on coordinating the equilibrium among players in a simple
sequential game – the Battle of the Sexes - with complete information. Players
are allowed to make nonbinding announcements about their intentional decisions. Farrell considers two possibilities: Only one player can send a message
of his/her intention (this is called a one-way communication), and both players can send messages to each other (a two-way communication). The author
shows that one-way communication efficiently coordinates players’ beliefs and
reaching equilibrium. On the other hand, two-way communication may result
in miscoordination. However, multiple rounds of two-way communication are
more effective than single rounds (Cooper et al. 1989, 1992; Rabin 1990, 1994).
Researchers have been further motivated to develop various experimental designs to study the impacts of communication on coordination effectiveness. Cooper et al. (1989, 1992) present experimental evidence on nonbinding
and preplay communication in coordination games.2 Consistent with Farrell’s
(1987, 1988) findings, Cooper et al. show that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
is more likely to achieve with one-way communication than the no communication circumstance in the cooperative coordination game (CCG). Interestingly,
two-way communication possibly increases the likelihood of coordination failures. The authors further consider an alternative game, called the simple coordination game (SCG). They find that two-way communication consistently
leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication
does not (Rabin 1990, 1994). Ellingsen and Östling (2010) extensively investigate how communication can facilitate coordination in a larger class of games
with one-way and two-way communication. They find that one-way and two1 We thank the referee for introducing a set of critical studies related to communication
in the literature of game theory and experimental economics.
2 Cooper et al. (1992) consider two types of coordination game: cooperative coordination
game (CCG) and simple coordination game (SCG). The CCG has a cooperative, dominated
strategy for both players, while SCG does not.
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way communication promote coordination: When both players make multiple
levels of thought processes, they coordinate and achieve the Nash equilibrium
(Crawford 2003).
Furthermore, Fonseca and Normann (2012) design an experiment investigating how communication influences pricing behaviors in a Bertrand oligopolistic market. The authors show that the communication process helps firms
yield higher profits. They also conclude that communication facilitates collusive pricing mechanisms and conflict mediation. There are more recent surveys presenting the literature on the effects of communication on coordinating
behaviors. For example, Camerer and Weber (2012) and Kriss and Weber
(2013) discuss the literature on communication in organizational economics
with experiments. Brandts et al. (2019) contribute a survey of communication
literature on laboratory experiments. While the research on communication
continues to flourish in game theory and experimental economics, the tools
for analyzing the interaction between communication processes and economic
outcomes remain limited in the mainstream literature (Babe 2018).
An alternative approach to communication, considered an information acquisition process, slowly enters mainstream economics, particularly macroeconomics and computational economics. While the substantive ideas can be
found in now-classic works in the political economy literature, such as Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), the modern communication and information acquisition
literature is relatively young. For example, financial economists have studied explanations for herding behavior in which rational investors demonstrate
some degree of behavioral convergence (Devenow and Welch 1996). Studies in
monetary economics investigate how information diffusion influences economic
forecasting behavior (Romer and Romer 2000; Muto 2011).
In the literature of political economy, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and Katz and
Lazarsfeld (1955) suggested a two-step flow of communication model where the
information (political ideas) flow from the media to the “opinion leaders,” and
then from the opinion leaders to the less-informed population called the “issue publics.” Inspired by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), Granato and Krause (2000)
investigate the flows of information acquisition empirically. Based on monthly
surveys of inflation expectations, the authors find that educational differences
contribute to asymmetric information diffusion. The expectations of more educated groups shape the expectations of the less educated groups.
Recent studies in macroeconomics and computational economics have focused on information acquisition through a specific learning mechanism called
adaptive learning. The adaptive learning approach allows individuals to learn
stochastic processes by updating their forecasts (expectations) over time as
new information becomes available (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).3 The theory
of adaptive learning has been recently implemented to study macroeconomic
3 Technically speaking, adaptive learning is a process where individuals update parameters
of a forecasting rule — perceived law of motion (PLM) — associated with the stochastic
process of the variable in question to reach the rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
(Bray 1982; Evans 1983). This process of convergence to REE requires a condition called the
E-stability condition. The E-stability condition determines the stability of the equilibrium
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policy (Granato et al. 2008; Muto 2011; Evans and McGough 2018; Mitra et
al. 2019). Researchers also investigate different scenarios of adaptive learning
processes under a widely-studied model known as the cobweb model.
The cobweb model was initially introduced to explain fluctuations of market equilibrium where the supply of a single good is affected by a production
lag.4 It has been comprehensively studied in the dynamic macroeconomic literature (see Muth 1961; Arifovic 1994; Evans and Honkapohja 2001; Branch and
McGough 2008; Pfajfar 2013; Evans and McGough 2020). It is assumed that
there are n firms in a competitive market producing a homogeneous product.
Since the production process takes time, firms need to decide the output level
before the actual market price can be observed. As a result, the optimal production level is determined by maximizing firms’ expected profits according to
their (rational or nonrational) expectations of the next period’s market price.
Previous studies of the cobweb model show that a unique equilibrium exists
when firms (agents) form either homogeneous or heterogeneous expectations
(Evans and Honkapohja 1996). Several versions of the cobweb model have been
studied in the context of adaptive learning literature. For example, Evans and
Honkapohja (1996) allow N types of agents to form different expectations with
different parameter estimates in the same structural forecasting rule. Giannitsarou (2003) studies the stability of rational expectations equilibria (REE)
under heterogeneous adaptive learning in an economy with a homogeneous
structure and finds that the stability conditions under heterogeneous learning
are not necessarily the same as those under homogeneous learning. Pfajfar
(2013) introduces the assumptions of information frictions and heterogeneity
in expectations formation to examine the equilibrium properties in the cobweb model. The author finds that intrinsic heterogeneity exists in the model
where “the forecasting rules are not equally costly and do not exhibit identical
performance in the long run” (p.1434).
While acquiring information through the adaptive learning process is reasonable, the vast majority of studies assume that individuals gather their information to forecast independently (Evans and Honkapohja 1996; Honkapohja
and Mitra 2003; Guse 2005, 2014; Branch and Evans 2007). This independent
forecasting process is rather a strong assumption, which does not allow agents
to interact with each other. This assumption holds only if all agents obtain
identical information. However, due to information heterogeneity (Granato
and Krause 2000; Pfajfar 2013), it is natural to believe less-informed individuals have incentives to acquire advanced information to improve their forecast
accuracy. In fact, information acquisition can be costly (Stigler 1961; Aidt

in which the parameters of a PLM adjust to the implied actual parameters operating in the
model, called the actual law of motion (ALM).
4 Kaldor (1934) introduced the cobweb model to explain fluctuations of market equilibrium in the agricultural sector, where the production process is affected by a time lag.
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2000).5 Individuals may consider acquiring advanced information through the
communicative process.
To date, few attempts have been made to investigate the role of information diffusion in the expectations formation in the cobweb model. Granato et
al. (2008) (hereafter, GGW), which examine the process of information interactions across firms in the cobweb model, is an exception. The authors present
an interactive cobweb model that allows for both information heterogeneity
and information diffusion. They assume that leading firms (leaders) make initial forecasts based on exogenous information, while following firms (followers)
form forecasts by observing leaders’ expectations with the possible interpretation or measurement errors. We call this one-way communication process the
uni-directional information diffusion (UID). This interactive economy with the
information transmission from leaders to followers results in a possibility of
up to three equilibria and expands the parameter space of potential learnable
equilibria. Equally important, the authors discover the “boomerang effect”
where followers’ inability to observe leaders’ expectations correctly causes a
reduction in leaders’ forecasting efficiency. GGW (2008) point out that the
boomerang effect occurs because leaders fail to realize that the followers’ interpretation errors create excess volatility.
GGW (2008) have put forward the hypothesis that social interactions influence expectations formation and market equilibria. However, their model has
a critical limitation: The UID process prohibits leaders from acquiring further information in the economy. Intuitively, suppose the leaders are aware of
their forecasting accuracy decline due to the information transfer. In that case,
they should have incentives to observe the followers’ behavior to improve their
forecast accuracy. Realistically, effective communication should be a two-way
process: sending messages and receiving feedback.
This paper investigates equilibrium properties, learnability, and forecast
accuracy in an economy under a more logical mechanism of information diffusion. We develop a two-way information exchange procedure called the bidirectional information diffusion (BID) process. This two-way communication
process allows the leaders to further revise their expectations by observing the
followers’ forecasts after the followers receive the leaders’ initial expectations.
Under the BID process, we find a possibility of up to five equilibria in the
model. For some parameter values, the space of at least one learnable solution
is expanded. More interestingly, we show that the BID process improves forecast efficiency for both leaders and followers. The boomerang effect disappears
if leaders correctly observe followers’ forecasts to revise their expectations.
This BID process is particularly important in the literature of macroeconomics and monetary policy. Fisher and Robertson (2016) point out that
5 In the literature of information acquisition, the seminal paper by Stigler (1961) introduces an information searching model where an imperfectly informed consumer acquires
an optimal level of information based on the cost of searching (Stigler 1962; McCall 1965;
Nelson 1970). Similarly, Aidt (2000) argues that some voters choose to be less informed due
to the high cost of understanding or consuming information, representing the opportunity
cost of disentangling the relevant information from unrelated or inaccurate information.
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the market responses to the Federal Reserve’s information provide “a wealth
of information to policymakers, ... and those generally interested in monetary policy.” Muto (2011) investigates the expectational stability conditions
of REE in a standard New Keynesian model, where the public forms expectations based on the central bank’s forecast in the process of adaptive learning.
The author shows that the central bank must respond to the public’s inflation
expectations more aggressively than the level suggested by the Taylor Principle
to ensure the model is expectational stable (Geiger and Sauter 2009).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the interactive cobweb model. We first briefly discuss the uni-directional information diffusion
process suggested by GGW (2008). Section 3 presents a modified interactive
model with the process of BID, where leaders can further revise their expectations by observing followers’ forecasts after followers receive the initial expectations from leaders to form expectations. In Section 4, we adopt a numerical
approach to study the number of steady states and the stability conditions
of the model. We also demonstrate the dynamics of equilibrium using simulations. Section 5 analyzes the forecast accuracy for both leaders and followers
under the BID’s process, and Section 6 concludes.

2 The Uni-directional Information Diffusion Process
We first consider an economy under the one-way communication process,
called the uni-directional information diffusion process (UID). Following GGW
(2008), we study the reduced form of the cobweb model below:
∗
yt = βEt−1
yt + γxt−1 + ηt ,

(1)

∗
where yt is the price level at time t, Et−1
yt is the average expectation (not

necessarily rational) of yt formed at the end of time t − 1, and ηt ∼ iid 0, ση2 .
An exogenous observable xt−1 follows a stationary AR (p) process driven by a
white noise shock. We assume Ext = 0 and Ex2t = σx2 . Under a cobweb model
with a single good, it must be that β < 0; however, there exists variants of the
cobweb model such that β ∈ (−∞, ∞).6 For example, Lucas’s (1972) model
shares the same reduced form as (1) with 0 < β < 1.
Equation (1) shows that the price level yt depends on three components: the

∗
self-referential expectations of yt formed in the previous period t − 1 Et−1
yt ,
a vector of exogenous variables xt , and a stochastic shock ηt . The fundamental
concept of the cobweb model is that there are n firms (individuals) producing
a homogeneous good in a competitive market. Since production takes time,
firms choose an optimal output level to maximize their expected profits in
∗
accordance with their expectations of the market price Et−1
yt formed in the
∗
prior period. As a result, the firms’ expectations on price Et−1
yt determine
their production decisions, which in turn affect the equilibrium market price
in the next period.
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perceived law of motion (PLM)) for the leaders can be written as:
yt = hxt−1 + t ,

6

(2)

and their expectations:
e
yL,t
= hxt−1 ,

(3)

7 Lucas (1972) derives the reduced form of equation (1) based on a monetary model
consisting of aggregate supply function, aggregate demand function, and a monetary policy
rule.
8 GLW (2011) empirically investigate the existence of the boomerang effect using surveyed inflation expectations data in the United States between 1978 and 2000. The authors
extend the applied statistical work of Granato and Krause (2000) by dividing the inflation
expectation survey data into different educational categories. They find a long-run positive relationship between the variance of observational errors from the less-educated group
and the mean square error (MSE) of the more educated group’s expectations. The empirical result confirms the existence of the boomerang effect. GLW (2011: 389) also state that
“[o]ne implication of this finding pertains to economic policy and economic volatility: because policymakers have more information than the public, the boomerang effect can lead
policymakers to make inaccurate forecasts of economic conditions and conduct erroneous
policies which contribute to economic instability.”
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e
where yL,t
represents the expectations of yt for the leaders at time t − 1. On
the other hand, since the followers lack xt−1 in their information set, they have
incentives to “observe” the leaders’ expectations. However, the followers may
not obtain the exact information from the leaders, or they may interpret leaders’ expectations differently among themselves (Kandel and Zilberfarb 1999).9
As a result, a distribution of interpretation errors vt−1 is introduced in the
model, and therefore the PLM for the followers and their expectations of yt
are presented as, respectively:

e
yt = c yL,t
+ vt−1 + t , and
(4)

e
e
yF,t = c yL,t + vt−1

= c (hxt−1 + vt−1 ) ,

(5)

e
where yF,t
is the followers’ expectations of yt at time t − 1, and vt−1 ∼

2
iid 0, σv represents unobservable interpretation errors uncorrelated with t
and xt−1 . The system of equations (2)–(5) describes the process of UID, which
is summarized in Figure 1. It shows that the more-informed leaders send their
e
forecasts yL,t
to the less-informed followers so that the followers can form their
e
forecasts yF,t
.
With the process of UID, there may exist multiple learnable equilibria if the
variance of interpretation errors vt is sufficiently large. Compared to the noninteractive model, individuals can learn the equilibria in the modified model
with a broader range of parameter values.
More importantly, GGW (2008) and GLW (2011) introduce the “boomerang
effect” in which the inaccurate forecasts of followers confound leaders’ forecast
accuracy, measured by the mean-square forecast error (MSE) since the leaders
are unable to observe the followers’ forecasting behavior fully. The authors also
find that the MSE of leaders can be higher than that of followers when the
proportion of followers is larger than that of leaders. This result implies that
the leaders can even have a lower level of forecast accuracy than the followers
if the followers are the majority in the market.

3 The Bi-directional Information Diffusion Process
3.1 The Basic BID Process
GGW (2008) and GLW (2011) offer a necessary foundation describing how a
simple process of information diffusion from leaders to followers can affect the
uniqueness and learnability of the equilibrium as well as the individuals’ forecasting performances. It is also interesting to see how the information diffusion
process can influence leaders’ forecast accuracy. However, if the leaders could
observe the forecast information from the followers, they would discover that
9 Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) find that people do not interpret existing information
identically. They show that the hypothesis of identical-information interpretation is rejected
using Israeli inflation forecast data.
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is the followers’
understanding of the leaders’ expectations of yt , and vt−1 ∼

iid 0, σv2 represents unobservable interpretation errors. Combining equations
(8) and (9), the expectations for the followers can be written as follows:


e1
e0
yF,t
= c yL,t
+ vt−1 .

(10)

The leaders have incentives to improve their forecasts. We introduce a
feedback mechanism where the leaders can observe the followers’ expectations
e1
yF,t
to revise their expectations. However, similar to the followers’ forecasting
model, we assume that there exists a distribution of usual interpretation errors
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e1
ut−1 , which makes the leaders imperfectly observe the followers’ forecasts yF,t
.
As a result, the revised forecasting model for the leaders can be written as:
e1
yt = bxt−1 + dỹF,t
+ t .

(11)

The corresponding expectations of yt for the leaders are:

⇒

e1
e1
yL,t
= bxt−1 + dỹF,t

(12)

e1
yL,t

(13)

= bxt−1 + d (chxt−1 + cvt−1 + ut−1 ) ,


e1
e1
where ỹF,t
= yF,t
+ ut−1 and ut−1 ∼ iid 0, σu2 . In this case, the system of
equations (7), (10), and (12) represent the BID process in the interactive model
e0
— the followers make use of the leaders’ initial expectations yL,t
to form their
e1
forecasts yF,t , and the leaders, in turn, observe the followers’ expectations to
e1
revise their initial forecasts, and modify their forecasts yL,t
. Figure 2 presents
the complete process of bi-directional informational diffusion, where the top
eo
arrow shows that the more-informed leaders send their initial forecasts yL,t
to the less-informed followers (from step 1 to step 2), and the bottom arrow
e1
shows that the lenders collect the followers’ forecasts (feedback) yF,t
in order to
revise their initial forecasts (from step 2 to step 3). The information diffusion
process described in Figure 2 is called the basic BID process.
As in GGW (2008) and GLW (2011), let the proportion of followers be µ
∗
and that of leaders 1 − µ. Hence, the market expectations of yt (i.e., Et−1
yt ) in
equation (1) is the weighted average of both followers’ expectations (equation
(10)) and leaders’ expectations (equation (13)):
e1
e1
∗
Et−1
yt = µyF,t
+ (1 − µ) yL,t
.

(14)

As a result, we can obtain the actual dynamic of yt (called the actual law of
motion (ALM)) by substituting equation (14) into the structural equation (1):
yt = [βb (1 − µ) + γ + βµch + β (1 − µ) dch] xt−1

+ βµcvt−1 + β (1 − µ) dcvt−1 + β (1 − µ) dut−1 + ηt ,

(15)

e1
e1
∗
.
where Et−1
+ (1 − µ) yL,t
yt = µyF,t

3.2 The n−iterated BID Process
According to the model discussed in Section
 3.1, the basic BID process ends
e1
after observing the followwhen the leaders revise their expectations yt,L

ers’ forecasting behavior in equation (10). The followers do not further revise
their expectations by observing the leaders’ expectations again. One may question: what if the followers can obtain the leaders’ revised expectations again?
This procedure creates a possible circular transmission of information between
leaders and followers.
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In this subsection, we explore this possibility and allow the BID process
between leaders and followers to occur for n iterations so that they can repeatedly observe one another’s expectations to form their forecasts n times.
As a result, the n-iterated forecasting models for the followers and leaders can
be written as follows, respectively:
en
yF,t
= cn dn−1 hxt−1 + b

n−1
X

di−1 ci xt−1

i=1

+

n
X

dn−1 cn+1−i vi,t−1 +

i=1

(16)
n−1
X

dn−i cn−i ui,t−1 ,

i=1

and:
en
yL,t
= dn cn hxt−1 + b

n
X

di−1 ci−1 xt−1

i=1

+

n
X

dn+1−i cn+1−i vi,t−1 +

i=1

n
X

(17)
dn+1−i cn−i ui,t−1 ,

i=1

where n > 1 is the number of iterations in the BID process between the
followers and the leaders. After some computation, the actual dynamic process
of yt after the n-iterated BID process can be written as:
yt = (A + B) xt−1 + Vt−1 + Ut−1 + ηt,

(18)

where the components of the coefficients on xt−1 , A and B, are:
A = cn dn−1 h [µ + d (1 − µ)] ,
)
(
n−1
X
dn−1 cn−1 + (1 − µ) dn−1 cn−1 ,
B = b [1 + µ (c − 1)]
i=1

and the structures of the noise terms can be expressed as:
" n
#
X
n−1 n+1−i
Vt−1 = [µ + (1 − µ) d]
d
c
vi,t−1 , and
i=1

Ut−1 = [µ + d (1 − µ)]

n−1
X
i=1

dn−i cn−i ui,t−1 + (1 − µ) dun,t−1.

Substituting equation (18) into equation (1), we can derive the following ALM:
yt = [β (A + B) + γ] xt−1 + βUt−1 + βVt−1 + ηt ,
(19)
P
n−1
where A = cn dn−1 h [µ + d (1 − µ)] , B =P
b{[1 + µ (c − 1)] i=1 dn−1 cn−1 +
n
n−1 n−1
n−1 n+1−i
(1 − µ) d
c
}, Vt−1 = [µ + (1 − µ) d]
c
vi,t−1 , and Ut−1 =
i=1 d
Pn−1
[µ + d (1 − µ)] i=1 dn−i cn−i ui,t−1 + (1 − µ) dun,t−1. The complete derivations of the leaders’ and followers’ forecasting models and the ALM of yt
under the n-iterated BID process are presented in Appendix 1.
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According to equations (16), (17), and (19), we note that a closed-form
solution of the equilibria is not available due to the complexity of the polynomial equation of the parameters. We also note that the number of orders
in the polynomial equation becomes 2n + 3. If there is an UID process (i.e.,
n = 0) as presented in GGW (2008) and GLW (2011), we obtain a thirdorder polynomial function which possibly generates three steady states (i.e.,
2 (0) + 3 = 3).
For the basic BID process (n = 1), there are five possible steady states
(i.e., 2 (1) + 3 = 5). In this case, each extra iteration of the BID process
generates two extra steady states in the model. This multi-iteration process
makes the theoretical analysis infeasible. As a result, we focus on the basic
BID process to investigate how such the bi-directional diffusion process can
affect the properties of steady state equilibria, stability conditions, as well as
forecast accuracy.

4 Steady States and Stability Conditions
To investigate the steady states and stability conditions in the interactive
model with the basic BID process, we use the system of equations (6), (8),
and (11) to derive the following T-mapping (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001):

  
Th (h, b, c, d)
h
 b   Tb (h, b, c, d) 

 
T
 c  =  Tc (h, b, c, d)  .
Td (h, b, c, d)
d

(20)

Next, we follow the approach suggested by Guse (2005) to derive the stochastic
equilibrium, called the mixed expectations equilibrium (MEE), which can be
presented as the following stochastic process:

¯ h̄ xt−1
yt = β b̄ (1 − µ) + γ + βµc̄h̄ + β (1 − µ) dc̄
¯ t−1 + β (1 − µ) du
¯ t−1 + ηt .
+ βµc̄vt−1 + β (1 − µ) dc̄v
¯ and h̄ are as follows, respectively:
The MEE parameters of b̄, c̄, d,

γ + c̄h̄ βµ + d¯(−1 + β − βµ)
b̄ =
1 + β (−1 + µ)
h̄ − h̄β − γ
c̄ = 1 +
h̄βµ
c̄2 βµa2
d¯ =
(1 + β (−1 + µ)) (1 + c̄2 a2 )


¯ h̄.
h̄ = β (1 − µ) b̄ + γ + βµc̄ + β (1 − µ) dc̄

(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
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As mentioned previously, the functions representing h̄, b̄, c̄, and d¯ are nonlinear — a quintic function. There may exist multiple steady states. We note
that the MEE in equations (21)-(24) have two parameters of interest:
a1 = σx2 /σv2
a2 = σv2 /σu2 .
The parameter a1 is the ratio of the variability of important forecasting information xt−1 to misinterpretation variability vt−1 in the followers’ forecasting
model (9). As a1 increases, the first stage of information diffusion from the
leaders to the followers becomes more useful. Similarly, since the leaders wish
to extract vt−1 in the second stage of interaction with the followers (i.e., observing the followers’ forecasting behavior), a2 is the ratio of the variability of
“useful” forecasting information vt−1 to misinterpretation variability ut−1 in
the leaders’ forecasting model (13). As a2 increases, the second stage of interaction (the information transmitted from the followers to the leaders) becomes
more useful. In other words, a higher value of a2 implies that the leaders have
a better ability to observe the followers’ forecast behavior under the feedback
mechanism. The complete derivation of the T-map and MEE are presented in
Appendix 2.

4.1 Equilibria and Stability Conditions: An Numerical Approach
Because there is no general technique for solving quintic functions, we take
a numerical approach to discuss the number of steady states, learnability of
such stochastic steady states, and the MSE for both leaders’ and followers’
forecasting models.
Figure 3 shows the number of steady states in the space of (a1 , β) given
different values of a2 , where a2 represents the usefulness of the second stage
of information diffusion from followers to leaders. While a unique steady state
exists in the non-interactive model with homogeneous expectations commonly
discussed in the literature, GGW (2008) show that the model under the UID
process from leaders to followers can have multiple steady states when a1 > 0,
β > 0 and a2 = 0. This result is shown in the first quadrant of Figure 3.10
The white region shows where there is one steady state, and the gray region
shows where there are three steady states.
The remaining quadrants present the number of steady states for different
values of a2 > 0, which allows the process of the basic BID. In the second
quadrant, we set a2 = 0.1, a situation where σu2 is ten times larger than σv2 .
It turns out that there can be one, three, or five real solutions. The lower two
quadrants show that as a2 increases, the regions of multiple solutions shrink,
and the region of a unique solution expands. It turns out that as a2 approaches
infinity (i.e., ut−1 = 0 ∀t), there will always exist a unique steady state for
10

We assume the following values for the parameters: γ = 2, µ = 0.9, and ση2 = 1.
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Fig. 3 Number of equilibria

e
any (a1 , β) pair. In this case, the leaders can correctly extract vt−1 from ỹt,F
,
given their knowledge of hxt−1 .
Next, we examine the learnability (E-stability condition) of the possible
equilibria in (a1 , β) space. To examine the E-stability condition, we consider
the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):

dφ
= T (φ) − φ,
dτ
where T is the mapping from the PLM in the system of equations (6), (8),
0
and (11), φ = (h, b, c, d) to the implied ALM, T (φ) in equation (20), and τ
denotes “notional” time. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) define an equilibrium
to be E-stable (that is, locally stable under least squares learning) if the ODE
is stable when evaluated at the equilibrium values. We illustrate the conditions
of uniqueness, multiplicity, and E-stability in Figure 4.
Under a traditional model without information interaction across individuals, the unique rational expectations equilibrium is (globally) learnable (Estable) when β < 1, and never learnable when β > 1. However, when the

16

Eran Guse, M. C. Sunny Wong

1.15

1.15
1.10

1.10

1.05

1.05

1.00

1.00

0.95

0.95

0.90

0.90
0.85

0.85
0.80

0 .0

0 0 .0 0 2 .0
0
0

04

0 .0

06

0 .0

08

0 .0

10

0 .0

12

0 .0

14

1.15

0.80

0 .0

1.15

1.10

1.10

1.05

1.05

1.00

1.00

0.95

0.95

0.90

0.90

0.85

0.85

0.80

0 .0

6
8
0
4
0 0 .0 0 2 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 .0 1 2 0 .0 1
0
0
0

0 0 .0 0 2 .0 0 4 .0 0 6 .0 0 8 0 .0 1
0
0
0
0

0

0 .0

12

0 .0

14

0.80

0 .0

0 0 .0 0 2 .0 0 4 .0 0 6 .0 0 8 0 .0 1
0
0
0
0

0

0 .0

12

0 .0

14

Fig. 4 E-stability properties

UID process is imposed in the model (GGW 2008), we find that at least one
MEE is always E-stable for β < 1, and two of the three possible MEE can be
learnable for some specific values of (a1 , β) located in the black region in the
first quadrant of Figure 4 (i.e., a2 = 0). More interestingly, GGW (2008) find
a new theoretical result that both leaders and followers can learn an equilibrium for some specific values of β > 1, which is not possible in a traditional,
non-interactive model.
The other quadrants show how the results change when leaders receive more
useful information from followers under the feedback mechanism. A higher
value of a2 implies that the leaders are more able to observe the followers’
forecasting behavior. The E-stability results remain unchanged in this case.
When β < 1, at least one MEE continues to be E-stable. Interestingly, we
find that as a2 increases, the region of two E-stable MEE shrinks. Although
there is a region with a possible five solutions when β > 1, only one MEE
will be learnable in this region. Finally, as a2 increases, the E-stable region
where β > 1 also becomes smaller. As a2 approaches infinity (i.e., a2 → ∞),
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Fig. 5 Simulations for leaders’ and followers’ forecasting models under the UID process

the E-stability condition collapses to β < 1 as in the traditional case of the
non-interactive model.

4.2 Model Illustration: Simulations
To understand the dynamics of the forecasting behaviors for both leaders and
followers visually, we simulate the model with a unique and stable equilibrium
numerically. In the first set of simulations, we consider the process of unidirectional information diffusion described in Section 2. We only allow the
leaders to release their expectations to the followers, but the leaders do not
observe the followers’ forecast behavior. Assuming that the market operates
under the structure of equation (1), we simulate equations (2) and (4) with
the following parameter values: β = 0.5, γ = 2, µ = 0.5, σv2 = 25, σx2 = 4,
and ση2 = 1. We simulate the model with a virtual time period of t = 25, 000.
To ensure the model be robust, we run 10 simulations. Each time series in the
figure represents one simulation of the model.
Figure 5 presents the dynamics of the simulated forecasting models for the
leaders and followers over time. We read the sub-figures across each row for
each respective parameter: the top row represents the simulated parameter
ht in the leaders’ forecasting model (equation (2)), and the bottom row the
simulated parameter ct in the followers’ forecasting model (equation (4)). Each
column represents a specific time period, ranging from t = 0 to t = 5, 000
for the first column, t = 5, 001 to t = 10, 000 for the second column, and
t = 10, 001 to t = 25, 000 for the last column. These break downs are done to
highlight the changes and convergence in the parameters.
Figure 5 demonstrates the learning process for leaders and followers. It
shows that leaders adjust their forecasting parameter ht in the first 2,000 periods. After the period 2,000, the parameter becomes more stable and converges
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Fig. 6 Simulations for leaders’ and followers’ forecasting models under the BID process

to the MEE of 3.55 (i.e., h̄ = 3.55). This pattern of the leaders’ forecasting behavior is robust and consistent according to those ten simulations. Similarly,
the followers learn quickly, and their forecasting parameter becomes stable
after period 1,000, and gradually approaches the MEE of 0.72 (i.e., c̄ = 0.72).
We note that both leaders’ and followers’ forecasting parameters do not
converge to the REE values: hREE = 4 and cREE = 1. The simulations describe the boomerang effect on expectations suggested by GGW (2008) and
GLW (2011). More importantly, we calculate the leaders’ forecast efficiency
using their MSE. After sharing their expectations to the followers, the leaders’
forecast accuracy decreases where M SEL = 1.816, which is higher than the
MSE in the standard model M SEL = ση = 1. GGW (2008) and GLW (2011)
called this result as the boomerang effect on forecast accuracy.
Next, we simulate the model with the basic BID process based on the
system of equations of (6), (10) and (12). The simulated results are presented
in Figure 6.11 As described previously, after the leaders share their forecasts
with the followers, they then observe the followers’ forecasting behavior to
revise their forecasts. The first two rows in Figure 6 represent the parameters
in the leaders’ forecasting model (bt and dt , respectively) in equation (12),
and the last row represents the parameter in the followers’ forecasting model
11 The parameters in the simulated model are: β = 0.75, γ = 2, µ = 0.9, σ 2 = 4, σ 2 = 4,
x
v
2 = 4, and σ 2 = 1.
σu
η
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ct in equation (10). Similar to Figure 5, after t = 2, 000, we find that both
leaders and followers can learn the equilibrium in the model, where b̄ = 5.01
and d¯ = 0.37 for the leaders’ forecasting model, and c̄ = 0.996 for the followers’
forecasting model.
5 Information Diffusion and Forecasting Efficiency
Finally, we consider how the basic BID process affects leaders’ and followers’
forecasting efficiency. At the MEE, the mean-square forecast errors (MSE) for
both leaders and followers are presented as, respectively:

2


2
¯ e1
M SEL = E yt − y e1
= E yt − b̄xt−1 + dỹ
(25)
L,t

F,t


2

2
e1
e0
M SEF = E yt − yF,t
= E yt − c̄ỹL,t
.

(26)

In order to standardize the comparison across models with different degrees of
BID, we define a measure, called an “adjusted” MSE (AMSE) for both leaders
and followers, presented as follows, respectively:
AM SEL =

M SEL − ση2
σv2

AM SEF =

M SEF − ση2
.
σv2

and:

Note that the most efficient forecast accuracy (i.e., the minimum level of MSE)
for all individuals in the standard dynamic model is M SE = ση2 . The adjusted
MSE (AM SE) represents the distance
of MSE for each group of individuals

from the most efficient level ση2 relative to the size of the variability of the
observational error generated by the followers in the interactive model. If there
is no boomerang effect on forecast accuracy for the leaders, AM SEL should
be zero (i.e., M SEL = ση2 ). It implies that the leaders obtain the most efficient
forecast model. Any positive value of AM SEL (AM SEL > 0) implies that the
leaders are unable to achieve the most efficient forecasts. According to GGW
(2008) and GLW (2011), the increase in leaders’ MSE under the UID process
is due to the imperfect information diffusion (i.e., there exists a finite σv2 ). This
result is called the boomerang effect on forecast accuracy.
As mentioned in the previous section, the UID process implicitly implies
that the leaders lack the ability to acquire information from the followers.
They are unable to observe that the followers’ forecasts cause disturbance to
the market and, therefore, impair the leaders’ forecast accuracy. This situation
motivates the leaders to re-observe the followers’ forecast behavior through
the process of BID. Our analysis shows that the leaders’ AM SEL decreases
asymptotically (i.e., the forecast accuracy increases) and approaches zero as
the leaders improve their ability to observe followers’ forecast behavior, indicated by a2 .
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Fig. 7 The adjusted MSE for leaders and followers

Figure 7 illustrates the results of boomerang effect on forecast accuracy.
Note that a2 = 0 and a2 > 0 represent two information diffusion processes: the
UID and BID, respectively. Under the UID, leaders do not observe followers’
forecast behavior. On the other hand, a positive value of a2 implies that the
model is under the process of basic BID, where leaders observe followers’ forecast behavior after receiving their forecasts. As a2 gets larger, leaders have a
better ability to observe followers’ forecast behavior. Given four different values of a1 , we plot AM SEF and AM SEL against a2 shown in four sub-figures
in Figure 7. The purpose of Figure 7 is to show how increases in a2 affect
leaders’ AMSE (the blue line) and followers’ AMSE (the red line) separately.
Again we note that the boomerang effect on forecast accuracy exists when the
leaders’ adjusted MSE is positive (i.e., AM SEL > 0).
In Figure 7, all quadrants show that both the leaders’ AMSE (the blue
line) and the followers’ AMSE (the red line) are downward sloping. In other
words, AM SEL and AM SEF at a2 = 0 are always higher than AM SEL
and AM SEF for a2 > 0. It implies that, compared with the UID process,
the basic BID process reduces forecasting bias for both leaders’ and followers’
forecasting models. We argue that an increase in a2 not only enhances the
leaders’ forecast efficiency (reducing the boomerang effect) but also slightly
improves the forecast quality for the followers. The followers’ AMSE decreases
as a2 increases because followers’ forecasts obtain more weight in the market
such that the self-fulfilling procedure helps the followers gain forecast accuracy.
More importantly, we find that if the leaders perfectly observe the followers’ forecast behavior through the process of basic BID (i.e., a2 → ∞
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when σu2 → 0), then the boomerang effect will completely disappear. That
is, lima2 →∞ AM SEL = 0, such that M SEL = ση2 . It implies that the leaders
regain the perfect forecast accuracy.
Our simulations confirm the theoretical prediction. We simulate the model
with the basic BID process and measure the accuracy of the leaders’ and followers’ forecasting models by varying the leaders’ ability in observing followers’
forecast behavior, indicated by a2 . Similar to the previous simulations, we run
10 simulations (with t = 25, 000 for each simulation) to obtain average values
of AM SEL and AM SEF for each value a2 ranging from 1 to 20. We then plot
AM SEL and AM SEF against a2 as shown in Figure 8. Figure 8 demonstrates
that as the leaders improve their observation on followers’ forecast behavior
(i.e., a2 increases), their AMSE decreases asymptotically.

6 Conclusion
Economic activities are built on social interaction and communication. Game
theorists and experimental economists view communication as a social behavior that helps facilitate coordination. On the other hand, macroeconomists and
computational economists realize that communication also serves the purpose
of information acquisition – people are informed by interacting with others via
verbal, written, and other non-verbal communication channels. Due to diverse
cultural, educational, or socioeconomic backgrounds, people do not receive or
comprehend information identically. More informed consumers and producers tend to make better decisions in society. Therefore, less-informed people
are motivated to communicate with those who are more-informed to obtain
advanced information. Similarly, policymakers are more familiar with specific
policies and social issues. Their views and criticism can influence the general
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public’s perception of social and political issues, which in turn can affect policy
effectiveness.
Until now, few attempts have been made to investigate the role of information diffusion systematically. Researchers traditionally assume that individuals
obtain a homogeneous set of observable information. This assumption eliminates the incentives for individuals to interact or communicate with others.
In fact, getting information can be costly. Individuals with higher costs of information acquisition would decide to obtain a smaller information set and
be more likely to observe and interpret the information obtained by moreinformed individuals. Although a limited number of studies have sought to
examine a particular information diffusion process, we argue that the theory
of information diffusion has not yet been fully developed in the literature, and
some relevant questions remained unanswered.
This paper investigates the dynamics of forecasting behavior and predictive
accuracy based on an interactive cobweb model with a more general information diffusion process. The cobweb model has been widely studied due to the
mathematical simplicity and the essential self-referential characteristic where
expectation formation affects the movements of endogenous variables. Our
interactive model is developed based upon the model suggested by Granato
et al. (2008), where they assume that the information diffusion process is
uni-directional: Leaders obtain information to form their forecasts, which are
transmitted to followers so that the followers can use the leaders’ forecasts to
develop their forecasts. This uni-directional information diffusion (UID) process causes “the boomerang effect,” where the leaders’ forecast accuracy drops
due to the followers’ inability to correctly observe the leaders’ expectations.
While this UID process is reasonable and has meaningful implications, one
may question: Why can’t the leaders, who are the more informed people, realize
that they are worse off due to the information diffusion process? Shouldn’t the
leaders have incentives to address their forecast accuracy issues to maximize
their welfare? We answered that leaders are unable to address the issue due to
the UID process, where the leaders are not allowed to observe the followers’
behavior to revise (or improve) their forecasts accordingly.
We introduced an alternative information exchange procedure called the
bi-directional information diffusion (BID) process: The leaders take on a further step to revise their expectations by observing the followers’ forecasts after
receiving the leaders’ initial form of expectations. This new stage of the communication process mimics the situation where leaders receive feedback from
followers. The model has up to five equilibria with the BID process and some
unique learnable and convergent conditions. More importantly, the second
stage of information diffusion improves the forecast efficiency for all individuals. The boomerang effect diminishes as the leaders’ ability to observe the
followers’ forecast behavior improves.
Our paper offers a better picture illustrating the procedure of information
exchange and its consequences. In contrast to the previous studies focusing
on a single directional flow of information transmission, it is logical to believe
that communication should be a bilateral process or even a multilateral process
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since there are obviously more than two groups of individuals in society. We
also suggest that this model may allow for creating compelling connections
between computational economics and experimental economics. For example,
due to the intuitive communication process presented in the model, researchers
may set up an experiment to compare the magnitude of the boomerang effect
under the UID and BID processes. On the other hand, this model makes
a vital policy suggestion that governments or central banks should develop a
channel for the public to submit their feedback about the policies effectively. A
robust communication channel can help policymakers better understand public
opinions, hence improve policy effectiveness and overall economic performance.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. The Interactive Model with the n−iterated BID Process
The model presented in Section 2 introduces the BID process in an interactive
model. The leaders initiate their forecasts, which are observed by the followers
for their expectation formation. After the followers form their expectations,
the leaders take a second step to observe the followers’ forecasts and use them
to revise their expectations. In this appendix, we describe this process in which
both leaders and followers exchange their information with each other for n
iterations.
The First Iteration of (basic) BID Process (n = 1)
Similar to the model in Section 2, we assume that the leaders initiate their
forecasts:
e0
yL,t
= hxt−1 .
(27)
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Then the followers observe the leaders’ initial expectations and form the following expectations:
e1
e0
yF,t
= cỹL,t
,
e1
yF,t
= chxt−1 + cv1,t−1 ,

(28)

e0
e0
where ỹL,t
= yL,t
+ v1,t−1 and vt−1 is the observational errors for the followers.
Finally, to complete the first iteration BID process, the leaders revise their
expectations by obtaining the followers’ expectations with observational errors
(ut−1 ):
e1
e1
yL,t
= bxt−1 + dỹF,t
e1
yL,t
= (b + dch) xt−1 + d (cv1,t−1 + u1,t−1 ) ,

where

e1
ỹF,t

=

e1
yF,t

(29)

+ u1,t−1 .

The Second Iteration of BID Process (n = 2)
Now, we assume that the followers realize that the leaders revise their expectations in equation (29). As a result, the followers also further revise their
expectations:

ei
ỹL,t

e2
e1
yF,t
= cỹL,t


e1
= c yL,t
+ v2,t−1

= bc + dc2 h xt−1 + dc2 v1,t−1 + cv2,t−1 + dcu1,t−1 ,

(30)

ei
yL,t

where
=
+ vi+1,t−1 , for i = 1, 2, · · · . The leaders then revise their
expectations according to the followers’ second-stage expectations in equation
(30):
e2
e2
yL,t
= bxt−1 + dỹF,t


= b (1 + dc) + d2 c2 h xt−1 + d2 c2 v1,t−1 + dcv2,t−1 + d2 cu1,t−1 + du2,t−1 ,
(31)
ei
ei
where ỹF,t
= yF,t
+ ui,t−1 , for i = 1, 2, · · · .

The Third Iteration of BID Process (n = 3)
This process will go on for n iterations. To establish a general pattern, we
consider the third iteration of the expectation formations for both followers
and leaders. In this case, the followers’ expectations can be written as:
e2
e3
yF,t
= cỹL,t


e2
= c yL,t
+ v3,t−1



= b c + dc2 + d2 c3 h xt−1 + d2 c3 v1,t−1 + dc2 v2,t−1 + cv3,t−1

+d2 c2 u1,t−1 + dcu2,t−1 ,

(32)
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and the leaders’ expectations are:
e3
e3
yL,t
= bxt−1 + dỹF,t



= b 1 + dc + d2 c2 + d3 c3 h xt−1 + d3 c3 v1,t−1 + d2 c2 v2,t−1 + dcv3,t−1

+d3 c2 u1,t−1 + d2 cu2,t−1 + du3,t−1 .

(33)

The nth Iteration of BID Process
According to equations (28), (30), and (32), we find that the expectations for
the followers with n iterations are:
en
yF,t
= cn dn−1 hxt−1 + b

n−1
X

di−1 ci xt−1

i=1

+

n
X

n−1 n+1−i

d

c

vi,t−1 +

i=1

n−1
X

dn−i cn−i ui,t−1 ,

(34)

i=1

e1
for n > 1. If n = 1, we have yF,t
= chxt−1 + cv1,t−1 presented in equation (28).
Similarly, we can use equations (29), (31), and (33) to obtain the expectations
for the leaders with n iterations, which can be expressed as:

en
= dn cn hxt−1 + b
yL,t

n
X

di−1 ci−1 xt−1

i=1

+

n
X

dn+1−i cn+1−i vi,t−1 +

n
X

dn+1−i cn−i ui,t−1 ,

(35)

i=1

i=1

for n ≥ 1.
The Market Expectations and Actual Law of Motions
Suppose that the proportion of followers is µ and that of leaders is 1 − µ.
n
The market expectations Et−1
yt can be computed as the weighted average of
followers’ and leaders’ expectations from equations (34) and (35):
en
en
n
Et−1
yt = µyF,t
+ (1 − µ) yL,t

n
Et−1
yt = (A + B) xt−1 + Vt−1 + Ut−1,

(36)
(37)

where the components of the coefficient on xt−1 , A and B, can be written as:
A = cn dn−1 h [µ + d (1 − µ)] ,
(
)
n−1
X
n−1 n−1
n−1 n−1
B = b [1 + µ (c − 1)]
d
c
+ (1 − µ) d
c
,
i=1
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and the composition of noise terms can be expressed as follows:
" n
#
X
n−1 n+1−i
Vt−1 = [µ + (1 − µ) d]
d
c
vi,t−1 ,
i=1

Ut−1 = [µ + d (1 − µ)]

n−1
X
i=1

dn−i cn−i ui,t−1 + (1 − µ) dun,t−1.

By substituting the market expectations (equation (37)) into the cobweb model
(1), we have derive the following ALM:
yt = [β (A + B) + γ] xt−1 + βUt−1 + βVt−1 + ηt ,
(38)
P
n−1
where A = cn dn−1 h [µ + d (1 − µ)] , B =P
b{[1 + µ (c − 1)] i=1 dn−1 cn−1 +
n
n−1 n+1−i
n−1 n−1
c
vi,t−1 , and Ut−1 =
(1 − µ) d
c
}, Vt−1 = [µ + (1 − µ) d]
i=1 d
Pn−1 n−i n−i
[µ + d (1 − µ)] i=1 d c ui,t−1 + (1 − µ) dun,t−1.
Appendix 2. Derivations of T-map and MEE under the Basic BID Process
In this appendix, we describe the derivations of the T-map for the model
with the basic BID process. Note that the form of each group of individuals’
PLM is inconsistent with the ALM. However, Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
show that a particular PLM is associated with a projected ALM, which is an
ALM projected onto the same class of a particular PLM. It is also “the best
description of the process within the permitted class of PLMs considered”
(Evans and Honkapohja 2001:322). We defined the projected ALM in our
model as follows (GGW 2008:350):
DEFINITION: For Type-j individuals, where j ∈ {L, F }, the Type-j pro0
0
jected ALM is Tj (φ) zj,t−1 + t , where Tj (φ) is from the linear projection
of equation (20) on zj,t−1, zj,t−1 is the information set used in PLM for each
type j, and φ is a vector representing the parameters used in each PLM.
The projected ALM for the followers can be obtained by computing the
following projections according to equations (8) and (15):
h
i
e0
E F EtF ỹL,t
=0
(39)

where F EtF represents followers’ forecast error at time t, which is defined as:
F EtF = yt − (Tc (hxt−1 + vt−1 )) ,

(40)

and
yt = Tc (hxt−1 + vt−1 ) + t ,
is the projected ALM associated with the PLM of followers. The followers’
forecast error is:
F EtF = [β (1 − µ) b + γ + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) h] xt−1

+ ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) vt−1 + β (1 − µ) dut−1 + ηt .

(41)
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By inserting (41) into (39), we consider the
 first component of the projected
ALM for followers, that is E F EtF hxt−1 :

E F EtF hxt−1 = h [β (1 − µ) b + γ + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) h] σx2 (42)

The second component E F EtL vt−1 can be written as:

E F EtF vt−1 = ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) σv2
(43)

Combining both components (42) and (43), we have E F EtF (hxt−1 + vt1 )
presented as:
h [β (1 − µ) b + γ + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) h] σx2
+ ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) σv2 = 0.
Now we let
a1 =

(44)

σx2
σv2

be the ratio of important information xt−1 , and unimportant information vt−1
for the followers. Then we rewrite equation (44) as:
h [β (1 − µ) b + γ + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc ) h] a1
+ (βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c − Tc = 0.

(45)

This gives us the T-mapping for c:
h [β (1 − µ) b + γ + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c) h] a1 + ((βµ + β (1 − µ) d) c)
.
1 + a1 h2
(46)
Next, we want to consider the linear projection for the leaders’ PLM before
they have the followers’ expectations. Using (7) and (15), we have the following
linear projection of initial forecasts for the leaders:
h
i
E F EtL0 xt−1 = 0,
(47)
Tc =

where:

F EtL0 = yt − Th xt−1

= [β (1 − µ) b + γ + (βµc + β (1 − µ) dc) h − Th ] xt−1

+βµcvt−1 + β (1 − µ) dcvt−1 + β (1 − µ) dut−1 + ηt ,

(48)

and
yt = Th xt−1 + t

(49)

is the projected ALM associated with the PLM of the leaders before having
the followers’ expectations. Equation (47) gives us the T-mapping for h:
Th = β (1 − µ) b + γ + (βµc + β (1 − µ) dc) h.

(50)
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Finally, we consider the linear projected ALM for the leaders’ PLM after
observing the followers’ expectations. According to equations (12) and (15),
this linear projection is written as follows:
h
i
E F EtL1 (xt−1 , chxt−1 + cvt−1 + ut−1 ) = 0,
(51)
where:

F EtL1 = [β (1 − µ) b + γ + βµch + β (1 − µ) dch − Tb − Td ch] xt−1
+ (βµ + β (1 − µ) d − Td ) cvt−1 + (β (1 − µ) d − Td ) ut−1

+ηt ,

(52)

and
yt = Tb xt−1 + Td (chxt−1 + cvt−1 + ut−1 ) + t

(53)

is the projected ALM associated with the PLM of the leaders after observing
the followers’ expectations. Combining the first component of (51) and (52)
gives the following T-mapping for b:
Tb = β (1 − µ) b + γ + βµch + β (1 − µ) dch − Td ch.

(54)

To obtain the T-mapping for d, we combine the second component of (51) and
(52), we have:
h
i
2
0 = (ch) (βµ + β (1 − µ) d − Td ) + ch (β (1 − µ) b + γ − Tb ) σx2 +
c2 (βµ + β (1 − µ) d − Td ) σv2 + (β (1 − µ) d − Td ) σu2 .

(55)

We get the following expression by dividing σv2 both sides in (55):
2

0 = (ch) (βµ + β (1 − µ) d − Td ) a1 + ch (β (1 − µ) b + γ − Tb ) a1 +
(β (1 − µ) d − Td )
c2 (βµ + β (1 − µ) d − Td ) +
,
a2
where:
a2 =

σv2
,
σu2

which is the ratio of important information vt−1 to unimportant information
ut−1 for the leaders. One can now solve the T-mapping for d:


1
2
2
2
Td (ch) a1 + c +
= (ch) (βµ + β (1 − µ) d) a1
a2
+ch (β (1 − µ) b + γ − Tb ) a1
(β (1 − µ) d)
+c2 (βµ + β (1 − µ) d) +
a2
and obtain
Td =

A
,
B

(56)
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where:
2

A = (ch) (βµ + β (1 − µ) d) a1 + ch (β (1 − µ) b + γ − Tb ) a1
(β (1 − µ) d)
+c2 (βµ + β (1 − µ) d) +
a2
and
B=



2

c



1
h a1 + 1 +
a2
2



.

In equilibrium, the PLM of xt−1 for the leaders’ initial expectation in equation (7) should be equivalent to that for the leaders’ revised expectations in
equation (13) such that Th = Tb + Td ch. As a result, we can, therefore, solve
for the mixed expectations equilibrium (MEE) in this model by equating the
ALM and a fixed point of the T-map (Guse 2005). The MEE can be derived
according to the following the (unprojected) ALM:

¯ h̄ xt−1
yt = β b̄ (1 − µ) + γ + βµc̄h̄ + β (1 − µ) dc̄
¯ t−1 + β (1 − µ) du
¯ t−1 + ηt ,
+ βµc̄vt−1 + β (1 − µ) dc̄v
where

 
b̄
 c̄ 
 =T
 d¯
h̄

   
b̄
Tb̄
 c̄   Tc̄ 
  =  .
 d¯  Td¯ 
Th̄
h̄

(57)

By simplifying Tb in equation (54), Tc in equation (46), Td in equation (56),
and Th in equation (50), we have:

γ + c̄h̄ βµ + d¯(−1 + β − βµ)
1 + β (−1 + µ)
h̄ − h̄β − γ
c̄ = 1 +
h̄βµ
c̄2 βµa2
d¯ =
(1 + β (−1 + µ)) (1 + c̄2 a2 )
b̄ =


¯ h̄
h̄ = β (1 − µ) b̄ + γ + βµc̄ + β (1 − µ) dc̄

(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)

Now by plugging equations (58), (59), and (60) into equation (61), we can first
obtain the expression of h̄, which is a quintic equation. It indicates that the
model has up to five real steady states. Given certain numerical parameters
for the model, we can, therefore, solve for the MEE of b̄, c̄, and d¯ from equations (58), (59), and (60), respectively. After we obtain the MEE, we can also
compute the MSE for leaders’ and followers’ forecasts from equations (25) and
(26), respectively.

